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Employers and Employees: A Call for Oklahoma's
Adoption of the Whistle-Blower Exception to the
Employment-at-Will Doctrine
The doctrine of terminable-at-will employment is a powerful tool in the
hands of an employer. The employer's power to fire employees without cause
can be used to influence the behavior of the employees.' If an employee is
directed by his employer to perform illegal acts, the influence of the
employer might be difficult to resist. Often the employee must choose be-
tween losing his livelihood and obeying the law. It is a choice that no
employee should have to make.
A number of courts have developed a remedy for employees fired because
they refused to disobey the law. These courts have developed a "whistle-
blower" exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine. They have found that it
is in the best interest of society for an employee to refuse to become the in-
strument of illegality. These courts have developed a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge that protects an employee who has refused to act il-
legally, or who has exposed his employer's illegal acts.
The purpose of this note is to explore the retaliatory discharge tort for an
employee who "blows the whistle" on his employer's illegal activity. Appli-
cation of this cause of action to the body of law already existing in
Oklahoma indicates that it is in Oklahoma's best interest to adopt it. Some
Oklahoma statutes have provided narrow exceptions to the terminable-at-will
doctrine, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has shown a willingness to make
judicial inroads on the at-will doctrine in Hall v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change.2 If presented with the opportunity, the court should also provide the
whistle-blower with an exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine.
The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the cause of action for
nonunion private sector employees. The establishment of the at-will doctrine
in Oklahoma is briefly discussed. 3 An analysis of some statutory exceptions
to the at-will doctrine in Oklahoma is provided as well as an examination of
the judicial exception suggested in Hall. The Hall exception is compared with
decisions in other states in which the whistle-blower exception to the at-will
doctrine has been adopted. Finally, this note demonstrates how the sound
reasoning of these courts should be applied to the law of Oklahoma; it shows
how the policies embodied in Oklahoma's law would be better served by ex-
tending the tort of retaliatory discharge to protect the whistle-blower.
1. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967).
2. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
3. For an excellent discussion of Hall and the at-will doctrine in Oklahoma, see Tepker,
Oklahoma's At-Will Rule: Heeding the Warnings of America's Evolving Employment Law?, 39
OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1986).
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The Oklahoma At- Will Doctrine
The terminable-at-will doctrine has been a mainstay in employment law
since the early years of the Oklahoma legal system. In Roddy v. United Mine
Workers,4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the right of an at-will
employee to terminate the employment relationship: "We take it as fun-
damental that any man, in the absence of a contract to work a definite time,
has a right to quit whenever he chooses, for any reason satisfactory to him,
or without any reason .... [H]is right to quit is absolute. '"
An employer's right to arbitrarily discharge an at-will employee was con-
firmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in McKelvy v. Choctaw Cotton Oil
Co. 6 The plaintiff's employment contract consisted of two letters, neither of
which established a definite term of employment. The plaintiff alleged that
he had been offered permanent employment. The court found that the offer
of permanent employment, even if proved, would offer no protection to the
employee because, "[a]s a general rule the word 'permanent', as applied to
employment, is construed to mean only that the [employee] shall retain the
position until one of the contracting parties shall elect to terminate it, and
this election may be an arbitrary one without assigning any cause therefor.",
The court has since had other occasions to confirm the terminable-at-will
doctrine. One court refused to find that a contract specifying an annual
salary is a contract for a term of one year.' If no specific term is called for,
the employment may be terminated at any time. An employee's waiver of his
right to quit was found to provide consideration for a contract.' The court
has found no need for the employer to show that any act of the employee
caused his discharge." Terminable-at-will employees may be terminated
without showing cause.
Oklahoma has, however, recognized some exceptions to the terminable-at-
will doctrine in the form of statutory limitations." The courts that have
4. 41 Okla. 621, 139 P. 126 (1914). This case involved a suit against the union by an
employee who was fired after he refused to join the union. The union had threatened to strike if
he was retained.
5. Id., 139 P. at 127. Since it was legal for each employee to exercise his right to quit, the
court found that it was legal for the union members to exercise this right collectively. Conse-
quently, the cause of action was defeated.
6. 52 Okla. 81, 152 P. 414 (1915).
7. Id., 1:52 P. at 415. See also Willock v. Downtown Airpark, 130 F. Supp. 704 (W.D.
Okla. 1955) (applying Oklahoma law to find employer's right to discharge employee at any
time); Foster v. Atlas Life Ins., 154 Okla. 80, 6 P.2d 805 (1932) (holding that an oral contract
for permanen: employment was no more than a contract for terminable-at-will employment).
8. Singh v. Cities Serv. Corp., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976).
9. Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. 1977). The employment manual contained
an offer for severance and vacation pay. The employee provided consideration for the contract
by continuing to work.
10. Sooner Broadcasting Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457 (Okla. 1955).
11. Under the Oklahoma Civil Rights Act, 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101-1801 (1981), employers
are not allowed to discharge a person based on that person's age, race, or sex. The Act also pro-
tects employees who oppose discriminatory practices by an employer. Id. § 1601. If an employee
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recognized the whistle-blower exception have almost unanimously required
that such limitations be based on clearly defined expressions of public
policy." Most of these expressions of public policy have been found in
statutes. The Oklahoma statutes show thar the legislature has recognized
public policies in favor of limiting the employer's power to dismiss at-will
employees. 3
A case recently decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized
another exception to terminable-at-will contracts. In Hall v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange,1" the court held that Farmers had breached an implied
covenant of good faith when they terminated Hall's agency contract. Hall
had been an agent for Farmers for sixteen years. He had been operating for
ten years under an agency contract that included a clause making the contract
terminable by either party upon three months' written notice. Prior to his
termination, Hall had been involved in a dispute with Farmers' district
manager over what Hall believed to be an unjust termination of another
agent.
Hall did not deny that the contract contained a provision for termination
of the agency. Rather, he asserted that the contract contained an implied
covenant of good faith and that Farmers violated that covenant by termi-
nating his agency without cause and in bad faith. He supported this conten-
tion by showing that the termination would deprive him of $225,000 in
renewal commissions. The court agreed that the contract contained an im-
plied covenant against a bad faith assertion of the termination-at-will
clause. I 5
The court specifically found that Farmers had resorted to the termination
clause of the contract to deprive Hall of his future income from renewal
premiums. The finding of bad faith rested upon the apparent intent of
Farmers to distribute the premiums to agents who were in closer agreement
with Farmers' employment policies.' 6 This finding provides, by analogy,
has been fired for his opposition to violations of the Civil Rights Act, the Oklahoma Human
Rights Commission has the authority to reinstate the employee with back pay. Id. § 1505(c)(2)
(Supp. 1985).
Other statutes subject employers who wrongfully discharge employees to criminal liability. It
is a misdemeanor to discharge an employee for serving jury duty, 38 OKLA. STAT. § 34 (1981);
for serving in the armed forces or militia, 44 OKLA. STAT. § 208 (1981); or for reporting wage
and hour or safety violations, 40 OKLA. STAT. § 199 (1981). In Oklahoma, a person may refuse
to perform an abortion without fear of being fired. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-741 (1981). An employee
who institutes a claim under the worker's compensation law is also protected from retaliatory
discharge. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (1981). Employees who are discharged for serving on a jury, 38
OKLA. STAT. § 35 (1981), or for filing a worker's compensation claim, 85 OKLA. STAT. § 6
(1981), are statutorily entitled to recover damages.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 80-91.
13. The judicial expansion of the policy in favor of limiting this exercise of employer power
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 79-91.
14. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
15. Id. at 1030.
16. Id.
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some support for the rationale of the whistle-blower exception to the
terminable-at-will doctrine. When an employee objects to the illegal or
unethical practices of his employer, he is likely to be replaced by someone
more compliant.1 7
The supreme court found that the removal of an employee for his disagree-
ment about the legal activity of his employer supported the employee's
allegation of a bad faith termination. 8 It logically follows that the court
would also find bad faith if an employee were terminated for refusing to par-
ticipate in the illegal activity of his employer. 9 The employee's reason for
disagreeing with the illegal activity is supported by the laws of the state.
Judicial interpretation of public policy should support this type of dissent
even more than Hall's objection to Farmers' employment policies.
Some of the language in Hall is contrary to the establishment of a
wrongful discharge tort action. The court noted that Hall was not seeking
recovery for income he had not yet earned.20 His recovery was based on
renewal premiums for policies that he had already sold. For a tort action for
wrongful discharge to provide a meaningful remedy for the average
employee, it should compensate him for future wages. The employee's term-
ination prevents him from earning those wages.
This distinction between renewal premiums and wages is not as great as it
might seem. Renewal premiums, like wages, are an expected part of an insur-
ance agent's regular income. The court noted that $35,000 of Hall's 1978 in-
come of $4.2,000 came from renewal premiums.' The average employee's ex-
pected income comes solely from his wages. Because of his wrongful termina-
tion, Hall recovered a substantial proportion of the income he would have
received if his agency had not been terminated. An employee whose regular
compensation does not include future commissions still suffers pecuniary
damage from a wrongful termination, even though his future income is not
as easily determined. The difficulty in determining damages should not
preclude an injured party from being compensated for his injury.
Activity Protected by the Whistle-Blower Tort
The exception to the at-will doctrine advocated in this note takes the form
of a tort action for retaliatory discharge.22 An employer should be liable for
17. Although this case dealt with an agency contract, the court recognized that the same
reasoning should apply to this case as applies to employment contracts. Id.
18. Id.
19. "[Bad faith] implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity.... [I]t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIOMNARY 127 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
20. 713 11.2d at 1031. But see Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 IER Cases 849, 851, 9
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not in-
tend a narrow application of Hall such that only earned benefits are protected).
21. 713 1'.2d at 1028.
22. The Oregon Supreme Court discussed the application of a tort remedy to the situation of
the wrongfully discharged employee in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). The
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/7
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damages resulting from his interference with certain protected activities of an
employee. Those activities should involve a clearly established public policy.
Courts have been willing to look to the criminal law, 23 to regulatory re-
quirements, 24 to a professional code of conduct, 25 to the common law of
torts, 26 or to the Constitution 27 to find policy reasons to protect the
employees' actions. Employees without the support of these clearly stated ex-
pressions of public policy are without the protection of the whistle-blower
tort.21
The protected activities to be discussed in this note can be divided into
three categories. The first category protects the employee who refuses to take
part in the illegal activity of the employer. The second category is the
employee's disclosure of illegal activity. These two categories are based on
well-defined expressions of public policy.2 9 The third category of protected
activity involves employees who base their criticism of an employer's ac-
tivities on moral or ethical objections. These employees are acting on per-
sonal perceptions of public policy. External expressions of public policy to
court stated that it would "direct [its] inquiry to the question of whether the plaintiff suffered
harm which the community would conclude should be compensated because of the conduct of
the defendants." Id., 536 P.2d at 514. The court considered this test in light of the employer's
use of the right to terminate an at-will employee to coerce the employee. It determined that
"there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially
undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done." Id., 536
P.2d at 515.
The discharge of the plaintiff for serving jury duty was found by the court to be a situation
that called for a tort remedy. Similarly, the discharge of an employee for refusing to perform an
illegal act, or for disclosing illegal activity, should be considered "a socially undesirable
motive." Consequently, the whistle-blower exception falls within the reasoning of the Nees
court. A cause of action sounding in tort is an appropriate remedy.
23. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to
fix prices in violation of antitrust laws); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (refusal to commit perjury); Palmateer v. International
Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (disclosure of criminal act by another
employee).
24. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 365 N.W.2d 385
(1978) (refusal to alter pollution control reports; employee stated cause of action but failed to
establish proof).
25. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (dicta).
26. Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (refusal to sign statement
defaming fellow employee).
27. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (refusal to take part in
employer's political activities protected by first amendment).
28. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (plaintiff
who alleged discharge after uncovering improper accounting practices did not state cause of ac-
tion because he was unable to show any of the practices violated state law); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 86 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (plaintiff's interpretation of obligations under
Hippocratic Oath is not clear expression of public policy); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113
Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (no fundamental violation of public policy as expressed in
statutes or constitution where there was no affirmative request to commit perjury).
29. See Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At-Will Employee Who "Blows the
Whistle": A Cause of Action Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 777.
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support these employees' actions are difficult to establish. A statute that
would provide tangible support for disobedience is often not available.
Employees in this category must ask the courts to protect their right to take
ethical positions that are not established by legislation."0
Refusal to Participate in Illegal Activity
The whistle-blower exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is an ex-
ception based on public policy." Public policy is clearly served when an
employee refuses to perform an illegal act,3 2 or if he discloses illegal
activity.3 3 This exception to the at-will doctrine enhances respect for the law
by providing a legal remedy for a person who has been injured because of his
attempt to comply with the law .
3
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters is an early case
finding a cause of action in the employee discharged for refusing to perform
an illegal act at the behest of his employer . 3 The plaintiff alleged that he was
fired for refusing to commit perjury. The defendant admitted that the plain-
tiff's term of employment was for as long as his work was satisfactory. The
plaintiff alleged that he had been informed the day before his testimony that
his work was very satisfactory. He was then instructed to make certain false
statements before a government commission. After testifying truthfully, he
was discharged.
The court recognized that an employment relationship, such as the one
described, is usually terminable at the will of either party. However, public
policy considerations, although difficult to define, place limits on the right to
discharge an employee. 3 ' One definition of an act against public policy that
the court found acceptable was, "whatever contravenes good morals or any
established interests of society."
' "3
30. There are, however, sound policy reasons why employees should be encouraged to ex-
press their ethical concerns to their employers. These concerns could alert the employer to situa-
tions that could damage their reputation or subject them to civil liability. Cf. 63 OKLA. STAT. §
1-741 (1981) (employee refusing to perform abortion protected).
31. See Comment, supra note 29.
32. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959).
33. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
34. See Sabint Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
Absolute employment at will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up vi-
sions ol the sweat shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. The
doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our law.... Our duty to update this doc-
trine is particularly urgent when the doctrine is used as leverage to incite violations
of our state and federal laws. Allowing an employer to require an employee to
break a law or face termination cannot help but promote a thorough disrespect for
the law and legal institutions of our society.
Id. at 735.
35. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
36. Id., 344 P.2d at 27.
37. Id.
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The court noted that the solicitation or commission of perjury is unlawful.
Such behavior interferes with the administration of justice and public affairs.
Because of this:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to
public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to
discharge an employee, whether the employment be for a
designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the
employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined
by statute.
38
The employers could have been found criminally liable for their actions. The
defendant argued that this was sufficient deterrence for their alleged actions.
However, the court found that the policy interests served by prohibiting per-
jury would be best served by providing civil sanctions in addition to the
available criminal sanctions.
Two other aspects of Petermann merit discussion. Petermann was fired for
disclosing information his employer wished to conceal. The opinion does not
state whether Petermann disclosed illegal activity with his testimony, but he
obviously provided information contrary to the interest of his employer.
Petermann made his disclosure under the legal compulsion of a subpoena. It
should, however, follow that voluntary disclosures would also be protected,
if such disclosures serve the public interest.
The Petermann court also noted that termination for refusing to commit
perjury was an example of bad faith. The court stated that an employer must
act in good faith when he discharges an employee whose term of employment
is to continue as long as his work is satisfactory. 39 This supported the court's
finding that Petermann was entitled to a civil remedy for his wrongful
discharge.
The cause of action for the discharged whistle-blower has found support in
other states. In a Texas case, an employee refused to pump the bilges of his
employer's boat into the water after he discovered that the procedure was il-
legal.4 He alleged that he was dismissed for this refusal. The Texas Supreme
Court found that these allegations stated a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. Public policy, as expressed by the criminal laws of Texas and the
United States, justifies what the court called a narrow exception to the
terminable-at-will doctrine for the employee who refuses to violate those
laws.4'
Reporting Employer's Illegal Acts
The public's interest in enforcing its laws is served when an employee
refuses to perform an illegal act. This interest is also served if illegal activity
38. Id.
39. Id. The Hall court also discussed bad faith as part of the rationale for its decision. 713
P.2d at 1030.
40. Sabine v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
41. Id. at 735.
1987]
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is brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities. Such disclosure by
employees is done at considerable personal risk. Since it is in the public's in-
terest for illegal activity to be stopped, it is also in the public's interest to
protect the whistle-blower from termination.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the public's interest was best served
when an employee cooperated with law enforcement authorities in a criminal
investigation.4 The court found a clear public policy mandate in favor of en-
forcing the state's criminal code. The employee was protecting the interests
of the public when he disclosed a possible violation of the criminal code and
cooperated in the subsequent criminal investigation. The tort of retaliatory
discharge was necessary to protect the public's interest in enforcing its
criminal laws.'
3
Public interests are similarly protected when the enforcement of a state's
credit code is enhanced by employee disclosure." The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals noted that the legislature had perceived a public need for
protecting consumers using credit and responded to the need with the credit
legislation. Public policy weighed heavily against the retaliatory discharge of
an employee who sought to ensure compliance with the protective statute.4 5
Employees are also protected when they report violations of state-
mandated patient care standards, '4 employer theft of customer property,4 7
and employer violation of air pollution standards. ' These cases involve
reports of information to appropriate enforcement authorities. Public policy
is served when illegality is brought to the attention of agencies charged with
the enforcement of the law.
Employees of a corporation seeking to remedy perceived illegality have had
more difficulty in finding protection from the courts. This result is inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the whistle-blower exception. If internal disclosure
can bring an end to the employer's improper activities, then public policy
goals are met. Accordingly, internal disclosure is an activity that should be
protected.4" The whistle-blower should be protected whether his disclosure
puts an end to improper activity through internal or external action.
In Murphy 1'. American Home Products Corp. ,1 an assistant treasurer of
the corporation was terminated after he uncovered illegal accounting pro-
cedures. Pursuant to corporate regulations, he reported the improprieties to
other officers and to directors of the corporation. The court refused to find
42. Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Il1. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee
fired for reporting violation of the criminal code by another employee).
43. Id., 421 N.E.2d at 880.
44. Harles,: v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1982).
45. Id. at 276.
46. McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984).
47. Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 704 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
48. Trombatta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385
(1978).
49. See Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower From Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MIcH. J.L.
REF. 277, 313-14 (1983).
50. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).
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an exception to New York's established doctrine of terminable-at-will
employment, finding that public policy is better determined by legislative
than by judicial action. 51 Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals refused to
find a cause of action for an employee discharged in retaliation for reporting
kickbacks to superiors. 52 An employee was not entitled to relief when he was
fired for reporting commercial bribes, alteration of commercial documents,
and misuse of corporate funds to corporate officers. 53 The Georgia Court of
Appeals declined to create a cause of action for a security guard who was
fired for "unauthorized off-site surveillance" when the employee alleged that
he was about to uncover criminal activity by a construction superintendent.
5 4
Deference to the legislature in these cases is misplaced. The legislature has
defined prohibited behavior by passing criminal laws and other regulations.
Enforcement of the law is enhanced when employees use internal channels to
stop or preempt illegal activity by their employer. Providing protection for
employees who take such measures does not constitute expansion of the
scope of the legislative enactments. The courts' action simply enables
employees to encourage compliance with the law without fear of losing their
jobs.
Criticism Based on Moral or Ethical Considerations
Employees who have been terminated for stating their objection to their
employer's unethical activity have had little success in finding protection
from the courts. The difficulty these employees have had in stating a cause of
action has been their failure to articulate a clearly defined public policy sup-
porting their position.
There is, however, a clearly defined public policy that protects the right of
citizens to criticize the positions taken by those in positions of authority. This
public policy is embodied in the first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.,5 an employee was fired
for refusing to take part in the political activities of his employer. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals sought to protect the employee's freedom of ex-
pression by holding: "[A]n important public policy is at stake, we now hold
that Novosel's allegations state a claim [under Pennsylvania law] in that
Novosel's complaint discloses no plausible and legitimate reason for termi-
nating his employment, and his discharge violates a clear mandate of public
policy.
'
656
51. Id., 448 N.E.2d at 96.
52. Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (deferring definition of public
policy to legislature).
53. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (failure to show
public injury).
54. Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978) (termination-at-
will authorized by statute).
55. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 900.
1987]
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Novosel was dealing with the freedom of an employee to express his
political views. Similar reasoning should be followed to protect the freedom
of an employee to express his ethical concerns about the activities of his
employer. An employer, like the government, has power that can be used to
control the actions of an individual. 7 This power should not be used to stifle
freedom of expression. Our political process benefits when citizens are able
to take par: in a free exchange of ideas. Because their freedom of expression
is protected, citizens are able to do this without fear of government reprisal.
Similarly, employees, as corporate citizens, should be free to express their
ideas about the conduct of their employer without fear of economic reprisal.
Just as the freedom of expression helps protect society from the arbitrary ex-
ercise of government power, the same freedom may be used to protect society
from an employer's arbitrary exercise of economic power."
Employees who have based their refusal to follow their employer's direc-
tions on ethical considerations have had difficulty in finding a legal remedy
for their termination. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,"' a physician
was discharged for refusing to participate in the research on a drug she con-
sidered dangerous. The doctor stated that her interpretation of the Hip-
pocratic Oath precluded her participation. Although a clearly defined pro-
hibition of involvement in such research might support her claim of
retaliatory discharge, the court would not allow her personal interpretation
of her ethical obligations to interfere with management decisions about what
kind of research to pursue.60
The court noted that the research had not reached the stage where testing
could create a risk to humans. At that point, testing would have to be ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration. The company was violating
no regulations or administrative orders. Because continued research violated
no clearly defined public policy, she could find no support for her refusal to
take part in the research."
Similarly, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. ,62 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found no cause of action for a salesman who refused to sell a
product he believed was unsafe. The court recognized the possibility of coer-
cion by the employer when an employee is responsible for making decisions
about product safety. An employee in this position could be deterred from
making decisions based on his independent judgment. 63 In this case, though,
the plaintiff's duties did not include evaluation of product safety. He was a
salesman, riot an engineer.
57. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1405. Professor Blades notes that this power is available to
the employer because of the employer's power to discharge an employee without cause.
58. Cf. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obed-
ience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279 (1971).
59. 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
60. Id., 417 A.2d at 512.
61. Id., 417 A.2d at 514.
62. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
63. Id., 319 A.2d at 178.
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The court expressed concern about the coercion that might be available to
an employee who knows that his termination would provide him with a cause
of action against his employer. The threat of a lawsuit would inhibit manage-
ment's ability to make personnel decisions based on employee qualifications
and thereby interfere with the employer's legitimate interest in hiring and re-
taining the best available personnel. 6" The court noted that even a talented
employee is not valuable to the employer if he is unable to work well with
fellow employees.
The plaintiff's action in bypassing his immediate supervisors to complain
about the product conflicted with the company's established procedures. The
court found that the plaintiff's discharge merely protected the employer's
legitimate business interests, and it would not recognize a cause of action
which interfered with these interests.
65
This case presents a dangerous argument for the employer who wishes to
avoid legitimate employee concerns about the corporation's responsibilities
to the public. 66 When an employee discovers problems that the employer does
not want to address, the employer can label the employee a troublemaker and
dismiss him. This will discourage an employee from pursuing avenues within
the corporate structure to remedy the perceived problems. The employer
loses the opportunity to dispose of the problems before they reach a point
where external remedies must be sought.
67
One example of bad faith the Oklahoma Supreme Court found in Hall was
Farmers' apparent desire to distribute Hall's renewal premiums among
agents who were less vocal in their opposition to Farmers' employment prac-
tices. 68 The court's holding indicates a willingness to protect an employee
who expresses his concern about his employer's behavior and concurrently
extends informal recognition to the whistle-blower exception. If the court is
willing to adopt this exception, the employee will benefit from the security of
knowing that he may express his views without fear of retribution. Surely,
the public also will benefit from the employer's increased awareness about
the consequences of his actions.
Whistle-Blower Exception as a Matter of Fairness to the Employee
The Hall court discussed the public's interest in employment contracts.
The court recognized the general freedom of private parties to enter into con-
tracts. It also noted: "Such freedom is not absolute however, and the in-
terests of the people of Oklahoma are not best served by a marketplace of
64. Id., 319 A.2d at 179.
65. Id., 319 A.2d at 180.
66. Geary's concern about the product's safety was shown to be legitimate by the subsequent
withdrawal of the product from the market.
67. For example, if the defective products Geary complained about had not been withdrawn
from the market, his employer faced litigation for products liability, which is potentially much
greater than that faced in a suit for retaliatory discharge.
68. 713 P.2d at 1030.
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cut-throat business dealings where the law of the jungle is thinly clad in con-
tractual lace."' 9 These interests are protected by a mutual covenant of good
faith, which is implicit in all contracts.
70
The covenant of good faith is a way of ensuring fairness between contract-
ing parties. Considerations of fairness are also important to the establish-
ment of the whistle-blower exception. An employee faces a difficult choice
when he is directed by his employer to perform illegal acts. He must either
follow instructions and face the risk of criminal liability, or refuse and face
the risk of losing his livelihood."
Employees who are faced with the choice of criminal involvement or
unemployment are in a no-win situation. If the risk of prosecution is smaller
than the risk of termination, the temptation is to follow the employer's in-
structions. Employees who are not protected by the civil employment law will
lose some o f their motivation to follow the criminal law. Unless employees
have a means of protecting their livelihood, they may choose to serve their
self-interest by complying with the command of their employer, instead of
serving the public's interest by complying with the command of the law.
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed this problem when it recog-
nized a cause of action for a discharged quality control director who insisted
on his employer's compliance with a Connecticut product-labeling law. 72 The
court noted that, under the statute, the employee could have been criminally
liable for failing to take action after his discovery of the labeling
discrepancy.7 3 The court decided that an employee "should not be put to an
election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued
employment."" Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff's allegations
stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.
Fairness dictates that the employee who acts to protect the public's interest
(and loses his job as the result of such action) should be entitled to seek a
remedy in a public forum. When an employee refuses to take part in criminal
activity, he is acting in recognition of public policy that has been clearly
defined by the legislature. 71 When he exposes such activity, he is promoting
the public's interest in having its laws enforced.
76
69. Id. at 1029.
70. Id. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters also discussed bad faith as a basis for
its decision to grant a civil remedy to the plaintiff. His termination for refusing to commit per-
jury was evidence of bad faith by the defendant. The court stated that an employer must act in
good faith when lie discharges an employee whose term of employment is to continue as long as
his work is satisfactory. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (1959).
71. Certainly, it must be considered unfair to force this choice upon an employee.
72. Sheets v. Freddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
73. Id., 427 A.2d at 388.
74. Id., 427 A.2d at 389.
75. See the discussion of Petermann, supra at text accompanying notes 35-39.
76. See Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)
(employee fired for reporting a violation of the criminal code by a fellow employee); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) (public policy favored protecting an employee
who had reported violations of the credit code by his employer). The employee who is aware of,
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The risk of losing a job might deter some employees from choosing
disclosure, unless they have some way of protecting their livelihood. A tort
action to deter retaliatory discharge" or to compensate the terminated
employee for the loss of employment would provide adequate protection.7 8 It
would allow employees to choose to disclose a violation of the public's in-
terest without substantial personal risk. Since it is in the public's interest for
illegal activity to be stopped, it is also in the public's interest to protect the
whistle-blower.
Deference to the Legislature
Many courts faced with the problem of retaliatory discharge have shown
great deference to the legislature. Courts that have allowed the discharged
whistle-blower a cause of action have done so because his actions protected a
public policy embodied in statutes of that jurisdiction. In Palmateer v. Inter-
national Harvester,7" the discharged employee's report of criminal activities
furthered the public policy defined by the Illinois Criminal Code." For the
policies embodied in the criminal code to be realized, the laws must be en-
forced. The report of criminal activities enhanced the state's enforcement
ability.
In Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad,8 the Michigan Court
of Appeals found that "exceptions [to the terminable-at-will doctrine] were
created to prevent individuals from contravening the public policy of this
state. It is without question that the public policy of this state does not con-
done attempts to violate its duly enacted laws." 82 Accordingly, the court held
that the employee had stated a cause of action when he alleged that he was
discharged for refusing to alter pollution control reports required under
Michigan law.
83
The above cases looked to statutes to determine what constitutes a clear
mandate of public policy. They used this mandate to establish an exception
to the common law doctrine of terminable-at-will employment. When the
but not involved in, the illegal activity of his employer does not face as difficult a situation as the
employee who is directed to perform the illegal acts. His failure to disclose the illegal activity of
his employer is not likely to subject him to criminal prosecution. However, if he chooses to act
in the public interest by disclosing the illegality, he faces the same risk of retaliatory discharge.
77. Punitive damages have been awarded to deter retaliatory discharge under Oklahoma's
worker's compensation statute. Hicks v. Tulsa Dynaspan, 695 P.2d 17, 19 (Okla. Ct. App.
1985).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
79. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
80. Id., 421 N.E.2d at 880.
81. 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
82. Id., 265 N.W.2d at 388. See also Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.
1985) ("We now hold that the public policy, as expressed in the laws of this state and the United
States which carry criminal penalties, requires a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.").
83. 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d at 388.
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discharge of an at-will employee frustrates the public policy embodied in
these statutes, the employee is entitled to recover damages in tort.
Some courts have asked for more from the legislature than an expression
of public policy. They have looked to the legislature to establish an exception
to the terminable-at-will doctrine before an employee can recover for
retaliatory discharge.8 4 In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.," an
employee alleged that he was discharged for reporting illegal accounting
practices to his superiors. The court refused to establish a new cause of ac-
tion without legislative involvement. The court reasoned that the legislature
was better equipped to weigh the public policy considerations involved in
establishing an action for retaliatory discharge. The legislature, after all,
would have the opportunity to hear all sides of the issue in public hearings.
Thus, contrasted with the partisan adversarial setting inherent in the litiga-
tion process, legislative enactment would provide a more balanced result in
establishing an exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine.86
Other courts have considered the argument that the creation of a new
cause of action is the prerogative of the legislature. The defendant in Sabine
Pilot Service v. Hauck pointed to statutory exceptions to the employment at-
will doctrine.' 7 He argued that any other exception should also be created by
the legislature. The Texas Supreme Court responded: "Although the
Legislature has created those exceptions to the doctrine, this court is free to
judicially amend a judicially created doctrine." 88
This approach addresses the needs of the discharged whistle-blower more
cogently than the position taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Mur-
phy. Although the New York court properly stated that the best forum for
establishing public policy is the legislature, it ignored the position that the
courts are the best forum for determining the needs of individuals who have
been harmed by the actions of others. The whistle-blower exception to the at-
will doctrine provides a judicial remedy to employees whose retaliatory
discharge violates existing expressions of public policy. In this instance the
court is not establishing policy but applying it to the needs of an injured
party.
84. But see Watassek v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d
617 (1985) (court applied a whistle-blower statute for public employees to a situation that arose
before the statute was enacted and found that this was an example of the Michigan legislature's
determination that public policy should protect the whistle-blower).
85. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
86. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 96, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 242. See also Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148
Ga. App. 193. 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978) (Georgia statutes confirm terminable-at-will doctrine);
Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (determination of public policy should be
left to the leghlature).
87. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
88. Id. at 735. See also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842
(1983) ("The at will doctrine is a common law principle .... [I]t is entirely appropriate that the
common law now recognize established constitutional and statutory policies in employment rela-
tionships.").
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/7
NOTES
Oklahoma has several statutory exceptions to the terminable-at-will doc-
trine. 9 These exceptions are the legislature's acknowledgment that the
employer's power over the employee's livelihood is not absolute. They
recognize such important public policy interests as the need for citizens to
serve jury duty, the need to maintain a militia, and the need to maintain a
safe workplace. However, these statutes do not address every situation in
which an employee should be protected from retaliatory discharge. As one
court has said, "[W]e also believe that the legislature has not and cannot
cover every type of wrongful termination that violates a clear mandate of
public policy." 90
This is clearly true. By passing statutes protecting employees from
retaliatory discharge, the legislature has responded to existing needs. In some
instances the statutes followed the reasoning of judicially created exceptions
to the at-will doctrine.9' In these leading cases, the courts responded to the
complaints of individual employees. The employees had been injured by the
retaliatory discharge; but because the discharge also violated public policy,
the courts were able to provide the employees with a remedy.
By enacting the statutes, the legislature recognized the need for general ap-
plication of the judicially created exceptions to at-will employment. The pro-
tection of employees from retaliatory discharge should not end with existing
legislative remedies. The courts must still be able to respond to the com-
plaints of individual employees whose discharge violates public policy. One
clear violation of public policy is the retaliatory discharge of an employee
who refuses to become involved in his employer's illegal activity. If the
Oklahoma courts are faced with this problem, they should be free to provide
a remedy.
Balancing the Employer's Interest: Arguments for the At- Will Doctrine
Various arguments have been advanced in support of the at-will doctrine.92
An employee may not be forced to work for a particular employer because
such a relationship is involuntary servitude-a violation of the thirteenth
89. See supra note 11.
90. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841-42 (1983).
91. For example, 85 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (1981), the retaliatory discharge provision of the
worker's compensation statute was enacted after a similar remedy had been judicially created in
several other states. See Annotation, Workmen's Compensation: Recovery from Discharge in
Retaliation For Filing Claim, 63 A.L.R.3d 979 (1975). 38 OKLA. STAT. § 34 (1981), the statute
protecting the employee who serves jury duty, was enacted after Oregon recognized a similar
protection in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
92. These will be discussed only as they relate to the whistle-blower exception. A general
criticism of the at-will doctrine is beyond the scope of this note. For a general discussion of the
at-will doctrine in Oklahoma, see Tepker, supra note 3, at 373. For the arguments in favor of
strict adherence to the at-will doctrine, see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
CH. L. REv. 947 (1984). A criticism of some of the abuses of the employer power created by the
at-will doctrine is found in Blades, supra- note 1.
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amendment.93 Since the employee is free to end the employment relationship
at any time, the principle of mutuality of obligation suggests that the
employer should also be free to end the relationship.94 However, this note
does not advocate a coerced reunion between the discharged whistle-blower
and his employer. The purpose of the whistle-blower tort is to compensate
the employee for the damages he has suffered from a retaliatory discharge."
An employer has a legitimate interest in maintaining the most productive
work force. 96 To do this he must be able to discharge his least productive
employees. The employer is entitled to some discretion in determining who is
or is not productive. The threat of a lawsuit for retaliatory discharge can in-
terfere with his discretion in personnel matters.97 However, the discharge of
an employee for refusing to take part in his employer's illegal activity is not a
legitimate exercise of discretion; it is a bad faith abuse of the employer's
power to control his personnel. The whistle-blower tort would not interfere
with the employer's legitimate exercise of discretion in his retention of qual-
ity personnel. It would only place a limit on the abuse of this discretion.
The at-will doctrine has also been praised for its administrative
efficiency. 9 Professional managers have more experience than the courts in
determining the feasibility of retaining employees. The costs of keeping
records to show good cause for terminations are a burden on the employer.
However, illegal activity also imposes a cost on society. The whistle-blower
who takes action to eliminate illegal activity should be protected. If an
employee can show that his termination was a result of his efforts to avoid il-
legal activity, it is not unfair to impose upon the employer the cost of at-
tempting to prove that the termination was justified.
To determine if the employee should have a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge, the legitimate needs of the employer must be balanced against the
public policy considerations behind the whistle-blower exception. Several
courts have considered factors to establish this balance. In Novosel v. Na-
93. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdicton" U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
94. See Tepker, supra note 3, at 390, discussing the inequities that make this rationale a
flawed justification for the at-will doctrine.
95. In some cases punitive damages should also be awarded to punish conduct that seriously
contravenes public policy. This would also protect other employees by discouraging retaliatory
discharge.
96. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1974).
97. But see Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of
managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation. We are, however,
equally mindful that the myriad of employees without the bargaining power to
command employment contracts for a definite term are entitled to a modicum of
judicial protection when their conduct as good citizens is punished by their
employers.
Id., 427 A.2d at 387-88.
98. See Epstein, supra note 92, at 959-60; Tepker, supra note 3, at 387.
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tionwide Insurance Co.,99 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggested the
following balancing factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interest of the other with which the actor's conduct in-
terferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the in-
terference, and
(g) the relations between the parties.' 00
When each of these factors is applied to the whistle-blower exception, the
balance weighs heavily in favor of discharged employees. Such employees are
fired for refusing to take part in their employer's illegal or unethical conduct.
They are motivated by a desire to avoid criminal liability. Retaliatory
discharge interferes with the employees' interest in continued employment.
Societal interests are advanced by protecting employees who seek to avoid
conduct contrary to the laws of society. Employees may refuse to follow in-
structions to engage in illegal activity without violating their contractual
obligations to their employer to perform their jobs.
The at-will employment relationship is one in which employees are depen-
dent on the good faith of their employer for their livelihood. Employers have
the authority to direct the activities of their employees. If the employees
refuse to follow directions, the employers have the power to fire them. This
power should not be amenable to abuse by employers. The whistle-blower
tort gives employees the right to limit the authority of their employer to
direct their activities without risking unemployment.
Burden of Proof
Once the court has recognized the cause of action, the plaintiff must prove
his case. Several factors must be proved. The court must determine if the
employee's termination has violated public policy and if there is a causal rela-
tionship between the firing and the wrongful action promoted by the
employer. Finally, if the plaintiff has established a cause of action, he must
prove his damages.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court established a division of the burden of
proof for the employee who brings an action for retaliatory discharge."0 ' The
employee must first convince the court that "the conduct that caused the
discharge was consistent with a clear and compelling public policy.", 2 This
99. 721 F.2d 894 (1983).
100. Id. at 901.
101. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
102. Id., 335 N.W.2d at 841.
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is a question of law that must be proved to survive a motion to dismiss. By
placing this. barden on the employee, the court protects the employer and the
judicial system from frivolous lawsuits.
This pleading requirement will probably not prevent all frivolous lawsuits.
There will probably be justifiably discharged employees who will try to take
advantage of the cause of action to shift their loss to their employers. This
does not mean that the needs of employees who are actually injured by
wrongful discharge should not be addressed by the courts. The purpose of
tort actions is to allocate losses to the parties who create the loss. 0 3 The
litigation process allows evidence to be presented that will show the party
who actually caused the loss. If an employee's job performance justified his
termination, his poor performance is the cause of his loss. When this is
shown, the employee will not recover. But if it can be shown that the
employer's wrongful act caused the employee's loss, the employee is entitled
to recover his loss from the employer. This places the burden of showing
some wrongful act on the employee.' 4
Frivolous lawsuits that are not overcome by this burden of proof will place
some burden on the legal system. However, the possibility that some litigants
will abuse the privilege of having access to the legal system should not
preclude deserving plaintiffs from having an opportunity to bring
meritorious claims before the court. The employee who can prove that his
discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy has a claim that deserves
to be heard.
Once the employee has established the public policy foundation for his
cause of action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish just
cause for the termination."' This provides job security for the employee who
has established a public policy in his favor. By protecting the employee who
acts in the public interest, the whistle-blower exception also helps to ensure
that important public policy needs will be met.'0 6
Remedies
Once the whistle-blower has proved his employer's liability for retaliatory
discharge, he is entitled to relief. He might seek relief in a variety of ways, in-
103. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 4 (5th ed.
1984).
104. One court has held that the defendant does not need to prove that her employer was ac-
tually involved in illegal activity to recover for retaliatory discharge. In McQuary v. Bel Air Con-
valescent Home, 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 24 (1984), the plaintiff was discharged for reporting
what she believed to be patient abuse in a nursing home. There was some question whether nurs-
ing home regulations would define her employer's conduct as actual abuse. The court balanced
the possible public harm from erroneous reports of violations against the Harm that would occur
if the threat of retaliation deterred employees from reporting patient abuse. The court deter-
mined that the societal interest in safe nursing home care weighs more heavily in favor of pro-
tecting the employee who makes good faith reports of regulatory violations.
105. But see Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) ("[lIt is the plain-
tiff's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason
other than his refusal to perform an illegal act.").
106. Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
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cluding reinstatement and recovery of damages for pecuniary loss and emo-
tional suffering. Punitive damages may be used to deter the kind of employer
misconduct that led to the retaliatory discharge suit.
Reinstatement is an equitable remedy that courts have traditionally been
reluctant to provide.'0 7 Because of the close personal nature of the employ-
ment relationship, the forced reunion between a discharged employee and his
former employer can be a burden on both parties.' 08 This is especially true in
the case of an employee who has just succeeded in showing his employer to
be a bad actor.
One Oklahoma limitation on the at-will doctrine provides reinstatement as
a remedy for wrongful discharge. The Oklahoma Human Rights Commission
has the ability to order this relief in some cases."0 9 The Commission is an ad-
ministrative body especially equipped to handle improper behavior by
employers toward workers. Reinstatement is not as desirable a remedy for a
judicially created cause of action. The courts lack the supervisory capacity to
ensure a workable reunion of discharged employees with their employers.
The primary injury a discharged employee suffers is the loss of his
livelihood. The average employee is operating on a budget that requires a
regular source of income. He expects this income to come from his wages.
When he is fired, his loss is measured not only by the lost wages but by the
effect this has on his entire financial condition. If an employee has been in a
position for a considerable time, he has probably accrued some benefits
based on seniority." 0 Many employees depend on their employment to pro-
vide a myriad of insurance needs, most notably life and health insurance.
Employees can lose the ability to obtain credit and also lose personal or real
property used to secure existing credit obligations.
In one early Oklahoma case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed con-
cern about the difficulty of determining the duration of an employment rela-
tionship for an indefinite term."' If the employee cannot point to any exact
time in the future when the employer's responsibility for payment of wages
ends, it is difficult to determine the amount of lost wages. Consequently, he
cannot calculate the actual damage caused by his termination.
It is admittedly difficult to determine the exact amount of compensation
an employee would have earned but for his retaliatory discharge. However, it
cannot be denied that the discharged employee has suffered a loss. The dif-
ficulty in determining the exact amount of recovery should not deny relief to
a deserving plaintiff. Other tortfeasors have been found liable in damages for
pain and suffering or for emotional distress."' The difficulty in determining
a monetary value of these damages has not resulted in their exclusion from
tort law.
107. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12 (1982).
108. See Malin, supra note 49, at 316-17.
109. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1505(b)(2) (1981).
110. For example, vacation time or credit toward a pension.
111. Foster v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 154 Okla. 80, 6 P.2d 805, 808 (1932).
112. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 103, § 12.
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Punitive damages should also be available as a remedy for retaliatory
discharge. Punitive damages are available to deter future misconduct of the
employer and to deter others in the same situation from similar
misconduct. 113 The use of the employer's power over the employee to coerce
the employee's participation in illegal activity is misconduct that should be
deterred. The ability to recover punitive damages can also be an incentive for
the discharged whistle-blower to bring suit. If the employee has quickly
secured alternative employment, his recovery for actual damages could be
negligible. If the ability to recover damages is thus limited, the discharged
employee will be reluctant to bring suit and the employer's activity will not
be subjected to judicial scrutiny. If the whistle-blower's activity furthers
public policy, his ability to demand satisfaction from his former employer
should be reinforced by punitive damages.
Conclusion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not decided a case dealing with the
whistle-blower exception to the at-will doctrine. The public policies embodied
in the laws of the state of Oklahoma would be best served if the whistle-
blower could recover in tort for this retaliatory discharge. This would create
greater respect for the law by protecting, rather than punishing, the employee
who insists on following its requirements.
Both the legislature and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have shown a will-
ingness to limit the absolute power of the employer to dismiss an at-will
employee. The legislature has passed statutes protecting the employee who
reports unsafe working conditions, who reports discriminatory employment
practices, or who serves his legal obligations. However, the legislature cannot
address every situation in which an employee's discharge violates public
policy. Judicial involvement is necessary to fill the gap between statutory ex-
ceptions to the at-will doctrine and other public policy needs.
Discharge of the whistle-blowing employee is a clear violation of public
policy. In Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,"4 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court recognized that the bad faith termination of an at-will employee will
make the employer liable for damages. It is hard to imagine a clearer exam-
ple of bad faith than termination of an employee for following the law. The
policies of the state of Oklahoma as expressed by the legislature and the
supreme court indicate that an Oklahoma whistle-blower should and would
be protected by an exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine of employ-
ment.
Donald R. Aubry
113. Hicks v. Tulsa Dynaspan, 695 P.2d 17, 19 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (punitive damages
necessary to deter retaliatory discharge under worker's compensation statute).
114. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/7
